



Political Rating Agency

The Political State of the World and Its Future

General Synthesis

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1. Purpose and central thesis

The book originated from a methodological question: can the political state of a country be measured with sufficient rigor — its institutional maturity, internal tensions, overall stability and projection power? This initial question gradually led to a broader one: what becomes of a humanity whose power has become planetary when the institutions capable of guiding it remain fragmented?

The central formula of the book is simple: humanity has globalized its power before it has globalized its wisdom. This is not merely a literary image; it points to a historical imbalance. Weapons, technologies, markets, platforms, data, supply chains, critical infrastructures, narratives, financial flows, pandemics and now artificial intelligence operate at a global scale, while the forms of responsibility and collective prudence remain largely fragmented.

PRA — Political Rating Agency — is therefore not only a method of political rating. It is an instrument for prospective analysis. The reader can follow the scenarios proposed by the author; the reader can also use the criteria, variables, clusters, hypotheses, questionnaire and Hypothesis Impact Matrix to discuss those scenarios or build another one.

2. The problem: planetary power, fragmented wisdom

The first part of the book begins with the problem itself. For a long time, human power remained limited by distance, communication, available resources and the scale of political organizations. The agricultural, administrative, industrial, scientific, digital and algorithmic revolutions gradually changed that scale. Contemporary power is no longer merely military or territorial; it is technological, financial, cognitive, informational, energy-related, biological, logistical and algorithmic.

States remain essential: they retain legal sovereignty, decisions of war and peace, diplomacy, taxation, police powers and military capacity. But they no longer suffice to describe the real distribution of power. Technology companies, attention platforms, payment systems, energy networks, port infrastructures, financial funds, semiconductor supply chains, AI laboratories, data producers, cyber actors and transnational ideological groups now participate in shaping the world order.

Facing this globalized power, political wisdom has not kept pace. In the book, wisdom is not merely an individual virtue: it refers to a collective and institutional capacity to assess the consequences of power, contain its excesses, limit its destructive uses and orient it toward sustainable purposes. This wisdom exists in fragments — constitutions, checks and balances, the rule of law, international institutions, regulations, conventions, courts and alliances — but it remains insufficiently organized at the scale of the available powers.

3. Shift in scale and contemporary fragmentation

Human history shows a recurring, though irregular, capacity to expand the circle of cooperation: families, clans, villages, cities, kingdoms, empires, states, alliances and international institutions. This evolution has never been linear or peaceful. Shifts in scale often occur after upheavals, when older forms are no longer sufficient to contain new risks.

1945 is a decisive precedent. The catastrophe did not create global wisdom, but it made an institutional shift in scale conceivable: the UN, human rights, economic cooperation, nascent international justice and European integration. The Cold War then imposed a paradoxical restraint: not true peace, but a prudence organized by nuclear deterrence.

The post-1991 period created the illusion of an automatic liberal convergence. Yet economic globalization did not mechanically produce legitimate global governance. Historical humiliations, restoration imaginaries, financial crises, regional conflicts, strategic dependencies, critical technologies and new private powers reintroduced a denser fragmentation. The world is not simply returning to bipolarity; it is becoming more interdependent, more fractured and harder to govern.

4. The PRA instrument: measuring in order to anticipate

The PRA method begins with a sequence of political measurement of states. It combines several dimensions: political maturity, internal tensions, overall stability, geopolitical power, composite indicators, results tables and validation through Principal Component Analysis. This sequence forms the initial laboratory: it shows that a state can be powerful without being fully solid, or stable without possessing equivalent global projection.

The approach is then extended to global prospective analysis. PRA retains a perimeter of roughly one hundred actors: states, alliances, institutions, private powers, platforms, infrastructures, financial, energy, informational, ideological, coercive or exposed actors. These actors are described through common variables: hegemony, restoration, critical resources, coercion, autonomy, dependence, personalization, informational power, ideological pressure and cooperation.

PCA and classification reveal families of actors, or clusters. The questionnaire and the Hypothesis Impact Matrix then transform qualitative hypotheses into analytical movements. The chain can be summarized as follows: questionnaire responses → impact matrix → adjusted variables → displaced actors → shifted clusters → narrative scenario. Prospective analysis begins when the map becomes dynamic.

5. The three author scenarios

The scenario of reasonableness describes a world that does not become wise, but contains certain drifts through prudence, crisis fatigue and fear of the worst. Great powers remain rivals, institutions remain imperfect, platforms remain powerful and democracies remain fragile; but mechanisms of restraint are rebuilt. Cooperation does not arise from a moral conversion, but from the cost of escalation becoming too high.

The scenario of wisdom is a regulatory utopia. It assumes that humanity accepts the need to build institutions proportionate to the risks it has produced: AI, climate, health, resources, information, peace and human dignity. Wisdom does not abolish states or political plurality; it seeks to articulate sovereignties, regional groupings and common institutions in truly planetary domains. Wisdom does not triumph: it becomes a discipline of survival.

The scenario of chaos describes failure: power continues to grow without any common principle of orientation. Resources, platforms, data, infrastructures, sanctions, currencies, narratives and technologies become weapons. Exposed states become theaters of confrontation, pivot powers become transactional, and international institutions become decorative. The world does not become empty; it becomes too full — too full of power for too little wisdom.

6. Lessons: world war, alliances, globalizing wisdom

Comparing the scenarios shows that reasonableness contains the imbalance without resolving it, that wisdom seeks to reduce it by institutionalizing long-term perspective and responsibility, and that chaos amplifies it until the system becomes increasingly ungovernable. The decisive variables include cooperation, coercion, asymmetric dependence, informational power, ideological pressure, hegemony, restoration and personalization of decision-making.

The book also questions world war. It may remain an identifiable event, but it may also become a state of the system: a combination of regional wars, cyberattacks, sanctions, infrastructure disruptions, informational manipulation, weaponized resources, technological fragmentation and automated decisions. Prevention then becomes systemic, not merely military.

The alliances of the twenty-first century will not be only military. They will also be technological, energy-related, industrial, financial, informational, climatic, sanitary, normative and anthropological. They may become alliances of fear, prudence or convergence. The central question remains: will they serve only to protect some against others, or to organize a shared responsibility in the face of planetary risks?

7. Synthetic conclusion

The book does not predict the future. It proposes an architecture for discussing possible trajectories. It rejects both spectacular pessimism and abstract optimism. It does not say that chaos is inevitable; it does not say that wisdom will triumph; it shows that trajectories depend on the forces our institutions choose to amplify or contain.

The political question of the century can then be stated as follows: how can a humanity endowed with growing power acquire enough wisdom to survive its own power? Wisdom is no longer a moral luxury. It has become a political condition of survival.

8. Operational elements of the PRA method

The elements below give this synthesis its operational dimension. They do not replace the technical annexes of the book, but they show immediately how PRA moves from a political diagnosis to a rating method, and then to scenario construction.

8.1 Political rating criteria for states

Code	Criterion	Short definition	Block
C1	Democratic level	Degree of political representation and effective electoral participation	Maturity
C5	Universal values	Adherence to universal principles (equality, dignity, human rights)	Maturity
C6	Fundamental freedoms	Level of protection of individual freedoms (expression, press, association)	Maturity
C7	Convictional rigidity	Degree of ideological closure and resistance to compromise	Maturity
C8	Rule of law	Judicial independence and respect for legal rules	Maturity
C9b	Religious tolerance	Capacity for coexistence among religious groups	Maturity
A1	Electoral dynamics	Vitality, regularity and competitiveness of elections	Maturity
A2	Government stability	Ability to maintain functional governments over time	Maturity
C2	Extreme ideologies	Presence and influence of radical ideologies in society	Tension
C3	Demographic transformation	Impact of demographic changes on social and political balance	Tension
C4	Social cleavages	Intensity of economic, cultural or identity-based divisions	Tension
C10	Belligerence	Tendency to resort to confrontation or political violence	Tension
C9	Political violence	Level of internal violence (riots, terrorism, civil conflicts)	Tension
A3	Internal crises	Frequency and intensity of political or institutional crises	Tension
AL1	Antisemitism	Level of hostility or discrimination toward Jewish populations	Tension

Code	Criterion	Short definition	Block
AL2	Narco-structures	Influence of criminal or mafia networks over the state	Tension
G1	Sovereignty	Ability to exercise autonomous control over territory and decisions	Geopolitics
G2	Strategic autonomy	Independence from external powers	Geopolitics
G10	External dependence	Level of economic, energy or strategic dependence	Geopolitics
G3	Military power	Conventional military capability and force projection	Geopolitics
G4	Nuclear deterrence	Possession and credibility of a nuclear arsenal	Geopolitics
G5	Economic power	Overall economic weight and capacity for economic influence	Geopolitics
G6	Hegemonic tendency	Willingness to extend influence or dominate other actors	Geopolitics
G7	Access to resources	Availability and control of strategic resources	Geopolitics
G11	Alliances	Ability to build and maintain structuring alliances	Geopolitics
G12	Geopolitical exposure	Level of exposure to international tensions or conflicts	Geopolitics
G13	Resilience	Ability to absorb shocks (economic, political, military)	Geopolitics
G14	Informational influence	Ability to influence perceptions (media, information, soft power)	Geopolitics

8.2 Reference prospective variables

Code	Name	Definition	Run 1 status	Meaning of a high score
TSI*	Internal solidity	Internal solidity / maturity-stability of the actor	Composite	High internal solidity/maturity
G*	Power	Power / strategic projection capability	Composite	High projection/power
H1	Hegemonic propensity	Hegemonic propensity	Semi-elementary	Stronger willingness to impose influence, norms or dependencies
H2	Restoration imaginary	Restoration imaginary / nostalgia for grandeur	Semi-elementary	Narrative of lost grandeur/restoration is more structuring
ER1	Economic interest and control of resources	Economic interest and control of critical resources/infrastructures	Semi-elementary	Greater interest/control over resources, markets or critical infrastructures
C1	Coercion mobilizable or already used	Coercion mobilizable or already used	Semi-elementary	Higher capacity for or use of coercion
A1	Strategic autonomy	Strategic autonomy	Semi-elementary	Stronger strategic autonomy
D1	Asymmetric dependence endured	Asymmetric dependence endured	Semi-elementary	Stronger asymmetric dependence endured
P1	Personalization of decision-making	Personalization of decision-making	Semi-elementary	More concentrated/personalized decision-making
I1	Informational power	Informational / cognitive power	Semi-elementary	Stronger influence over data, attention, narratives or algorithms
I2	Polarizing ideological pressure	Polarizing ideological pressure	Semi-elementary	More structuring ideological polarization
M1	Cooperative orientation	Cooperative / multilateral orientation	Semi-elementary	Stronger cooperative/multilateral orientation

8.3 Driver hypotheses and impact logic

Each driver in the questionnaire can affect several variables and several families of actors. The table below summarizes the driver hypotheses and their impact comments in condensed form.

Code	Hypothesis / driver	Sensitive clusters	Impact comment
Q1	Economic globalization	1, 3, 4, 5, 6	The more the answer moves toward +2, the more interdependencies become strategic dependencies and the less cooperation plays a stabilizing role.
Q2	Technological blocs	1, 3, 4, 5, 7	Technological closure reinforces autonomy, cognitive power and dependencies on bloc infrastructures.
Q3	Critical resources	1, 3, 4, 6	Tension over resources increases ER1, coercion and dependence, especially for infrastructures and exposed actors.
Q4	AI	1, 2, 5, 7	Destabilizing AI increases I1, C1 and I2; cooperative AI would have the opposite effect.
Q5	Private digital platforms	1, 3, 5, 7	The quasi-sovereignty of platforms reinforces I1, private autonomy and asymmetries of public control.
Q6	Multilateralism	1, 2, 3, 5, 6	The retreat of multilateralism weakens M1 and reinforces coercion, hegemony and dependencies.
Q7	Ideological polarization	1, 2, 3, 5, 7	Ideological polarization directly reinforces I2 and weakens the capacity for compromise.
Q8	Political/radical Islam	1, 2, 3, 5	Political/radical Islam acts as an ideological and coercive driver, mainly affecting cluster 2 and exposed areas.
Q9	Antisemitism and conspiracy thinking	1, 2, 5, 7	Antisemitism and conspiracy thinking are treated as transversal amplifiers of polarization and cognitive disintegration.
Q10	The woke/anti-woke conflict	2, 5, 7	The woke/anti-woke pair is treated as a cultural factor of democratic fragmentation when it is included.
Q11	Regional political Shiism	1, 2, 3, 6	Regional political Shiism primarily affects Iran, its proxies, exposed Middle Eastern states and pivot powers.
Q12	Restorationist nationalisms	1, 2, 5, 6	Restorationist nationalisms fuel H2, H1 and C1, and reduce the propensity for multilateral compromise.
Q13	Private powers	1, 4, 5, 7	Private powers increase non-state autonomy and shift part of power toward infrastructures.
Q14	Economic/legal coercion	1, 3, 4, 5, 6	Economic/legal coercion normalizes the exercise of coercive power outside open war.
Q15	Climate, migration and health	2, 3, 5, 6	Climate, migration and health become factors of dependence and tension when they move beyond ordinary management.
Q16	Liberal democracies	1, 2, 5, 7	The erosion of liberal democracies weakens M1 and increases I2 and D1.
Q17	Authoritarian regimes	1, 2, 5, 7	The effectiveness of authoritarian regimes reinforces C1, P1 and I1, and weakens the cooperative model.
Q18	Military conflictuality	1, 2, 3, 5, 6	Military conflictuality directly activates C1, H1 and D1, and weakens M1.

8.4 Transformation chain: questionnaire → scenario

Step	Input	Processing	Verifiable output
1. Questionnaire	Responses -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, DK, NA, PO	Neutralize DK/NA/PO; retain only active codes from -2 to +2	Vector of active responses
2. Hypothesis Impact Matrix	Vector of active responses + coefficients by variable	Multiply responses × coefficients × damping factor	Global variable deltas
3. Actor / cluster sensitivity	Actor families, clusters, types, zones	Apply differentiated sensitivity by actor/family/cluster	Adjusted actor scores
4. Projection in PCA	Adjusted scores + reference axes	Reproject into CP1/CP2/CP3 space without recalculating PCA	Adjusted coordinates
5. Cluster shifts	Initial and adjusted coordinates	Calculate centroids, directions, intensity, density and possible shifts	Dynamic map by scenario
6. Narrative	Shifts + affected actors + methodological constraints	Write a narrative constrained by the results	Traceable and criticizable scenario
Prudence rule	Scenario-zero	All responses set to 0	No additional variation; it serves as the baseline.

8.5 Reference questionnaire — response options

For each driver, the questionnaire offers a range of responses generally oriented from -2 to +2. These values are not moral judgments: they indicate an inflection relative to the reference continuity. The DK, NA and PO codes make it possible to neutralize a question or mark a reservation.

Code	Driver	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
Q1	Economic globalization	continues to progress	stabilizes	slows down	regresses into blocs	fragments abruptly
Q2	Technological blocs	remain open	coordinate partially	regionalize	close off	become hostile
Q3	Critical resources	are subject to cooperative regulation	remain manageable	create occasional tensions	become objects of confrontation	trigger major crises
Q4	AI	mainly reinforces productivity and knowledge	remains ambivalent but regulated	increases asymmetries	reinforces surveillance and manipulation	becomes a factor of systemic destabilization
Q5	Private digital platforms	are strongly regulated	accept shared governance	retain their current power	become quasi-sovereign	largely escape public control
Q6	Multilateralism	strengthens	is selectively maintained	stagnates	weakens significantly	becomes marginalized
Q7	Ideological polarization	recedes	remains contained	progresses moderately	strongly structures societies	becomes a central driver of conflicts
Q8	Political/radical Islam	normalizes or recedes	remains regionally contained	recomposes itself	expands through networks	becomes a major transnational driver
Q9	Antisemitism and conspiracy thinking	recede	remain marginal	progress at the margins	become transversal	structure multiple mobilizations
Q10	The woke/anti-woke conflict	calms down	remains culturally contained	polarizes some spaces	weakens democracies	becomes a strategic factor of fragmentation
Q11	Regional political Shiism	recedes	remains regionally contained	recomposes itself	consolidates	becomes a major factor of regional recomposition
Q12	Restorationist nationalisms	recede	remain rhetorical	progress	structure power politics	dominate several regional trajectories
Q13	Private powers	are subordinated to public rules	cooperate with states	remain hybrid	compete with states	assume quasi-sovereign functions
Q14	Economic/legal coercion	decreases	remains targeted	becomes normalized	becomes an ordinary mode of power	fractures the global economic order
Q15	Climate, migration and health	foster cooperation	remain manageable	create recurring tensions	disorganize several regions	trigger systemic crises
Q16	Liberal democracies	consolidate	resist	erode slowly	polarize strongly	enter a lasting crisis
Q17	Authoritarian regimes	soften	stabilize	gain relative effectiveness	export their methods	become the dominant model of controlled order
Q18	Military conflictuality	recedes	remains localized	increases regionally	extends between blocs	threatens world order

9. Use of this synthesis

This synthesis serves as a standalone gateway to the final publishable version v2.3: it condenses the narrative while making immediately visible the PRA functionality for constructing scenarios.